Annual Family Law Update: Missouri Appellate Decisions and Legislative Developments from 2017–2018
Missouri family law continues to develop through appellate court decisions and changes to state statutes. These developments affect child support, paternity, child custody, parenting time, property division, spousal maintenance, adoption, and other domestic relations matters.
This annual family law update reviews significant Missouri appellate decisions from 2017 and early 2018, along with legislation affecting adoption records. The decisions provide important guidance about how courts evaluate financial circumstances, parental relationships, custody arrangements, and the division of marital assets.
The cases are organized by subject matter, with an explanation of the legal issue, relevant background, appellate court’s decision, and practical implications.
Child Support
Beermann v. Jones, 524 S.W.3d 545 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether a child support modification may be applied retroactively before the prevailing party requested the modification.
Background: The parties dissolved their marriage in November 1998. They had one child, born in 1997.
Under a previous modification judgment, the father agreed to pay 100% of the child’s college expenses.
In January 2015, approximately eight months before the child began college, the father filed a motion to modify child support. He sought to reduce his $560 monthly obligation to either $355 or $158, citing changes in the parties’ incomes.
On April 22, 2015, the mother filed a motion to enforce the existing judgment regarding uncovered medical expenses, extraordinary expenses, and college expenses.
On October 9, 2015, she filed a counter-motion seeking increased child support. She alleged that the child spent more time with her or at college, the father’s income had increased, the child’s expenses had increased, and she had paid most of the child’s direct expenses.
The trial court adopted a presumed child support amount of $1,006 per month and made the increase retroactive to periods before the mother’s counter-motion.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had improperly applied the increased child support obligation retroactively.
Although the father filed the initial modification motion, he sought a reduction rather than an increase. Because the mother prevailed on the modification issue, the increased support obligation could not be made effective before October 9, 2015, when she filed her counter-motion.
The appellate court reversed the retroactive portions of the judgment that preceded the mother’s request.
Key Takeaway: The timing of a child support modification request can significantly affect retroactive support. When competing motions are filed, the prevailing party’s request may determine the earliest permissible effective date.
Selleck v. Selleck, 528 S.W.3d 471 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether financial gifts from a parent’s relatives must be included as income when calculating child support.
Background: The father appealed a judgment increasing his monthly child support obligation.
He argued that the trial court failed to include substantial monetary gifts received by the mother from her parents.
Although the mother’s monthly wages were significantly lower than her expenses, she had not accumulated substantial debt. The father contended that financial assistance from her parents allowed her to maintain a higher standard of living.
The mother acknowledged receiving occasional financial assistance but testified that the gifts were irregular and did not involve predictable amounts.
The father presented no direct evidence establishing a consistent schedule or amount of financial assistance.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to exclude the gifts from the mother’s income.
The court explained that trial courts have considerable discretion when deciding whether gifts should be included in child support calculations.
Although no financial resource is categorically exempt from consideration, irregular gifts may be excluded when they lack the predictability and stability necessary to qualify as income.
The record also did not establish that the mother had unconditional control over the gifts or a legal entitlement to receive future payments.
Key Takeaway: Financial gifts may be considered when calculating child support, but their treatment depends on the circumstances. Regular, predictable assistance is different from occasional voluntary gifts.
Keller v. Keller, 516 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether child support may continue beyond age 18 when an adult child is mentally incapacitated and unable to support himself.
Background: After the parties’ son reached age 18, the father sought continuation of child support under Section 452.340.4, RSMo.
The son had been diagnosed with autism, anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and bipolar disorder.
The father argued that the son’s conditions prevented him from supporting himself and that he was insolvent and unmarried.
The mother challenged the trial court’s findings concerning the son’s ability to support himself and his financial circumstances.
The son had previously worked approximately two-and-a-half-hour shifts three days per week. However, the employment caused substantial stress, and he eventually stopped working.
The father testified that he did not believe the son could maintain an eight-hour workday or work more hours than he had at his previous job.
The mother, who had professional experience assisting individuals with disabilities, testified that additional resources and services might help the son live more independently.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The mother acknowledged that the son had a mental incapacity but disputed whether it prevented him from supporting himself.
Because the existence of the incapacity was not contested, the trial court could consider the father’s testimony concerning its practical effects on the son’s employment abilities.
The appellate court emphasized that when the evidence reasonably supports competing conclusions, it generally defers to the trial court’s evaluation.
Regarding insolvency, the evidence showed that the son’s reasonable monthly living expenses were approximately $1,260, while his disability benefits totaled only $734 per month.
That evidence supported the finding that he could not meet his financial obligations.
Key Takeaway: Under Section 452.340.4, child support may continue for an adult child who satisfies the statutory requirements concerning incapacity, inability to support himself, insolvency, and marital status. Evidence concerning employment limitations and living expenses can be particularly important.
Richardson v. Richardson, No. ED104179, 2018 WL 1056530 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018)
Issue: Whether equal parenting time automatically entitles a parent to a 50% overnight adjustment in the Form 14 child support calculation.
Background: The parties shared equal physical custody of their two children.
The father’s gross monthly income was $3,566, and the mother’s gross monthly income was $1,378.
The trial court calculated the father’s child support obligation at $850 per month.
The father appealed, arguing that Section 452.340.11 permitted a 50% adjustment because the parties exercised equal parenting time.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Missouri courts must apply Rule 88.01 and the Form 14 directions when determining the presumed child support amount.
Under the Form 14 directions applicable to this case, the paying parent could receive an overnight adjustment based on the number of overnight periods exercised.
The directions provided a 10% adjustment for 92 to 109 overnight periods and permitted adjustments exceeding 10%, up to 50%, for more than 109 overnight periods.
However, Line 11 contained an income limitation.
The adjusted monthly gross income of the parent receiving support had to exceed a specified minimum before the overnight adjustment could be applied.
For two children, the applicable minimum was $1,700.
Because the mother’s income was only $1,378 per month, the father did not qualify for the requested adjustment.
The appellate court explained that the limitation was mandatory rather than discretionary.
Key Takeaway: Equal parenting time does not necessarily eliminate or substantially reduce child support. Courts must apply all applicable Form 14 requirements, including income limitations on overnight adjustments.
Arndt v. Arndt, 519 S.W.3d 890 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether life insurance premiums benefiting children may be included in a spouse’s reasonable needs when calculating maintenance.
Background: The husband sought modification of his maintenance obligation.
One issue concerned the wife’s life insurance policy, which named the parties’ children as beneficiaries.
The wife included the insurance premiums among her reasonable monthly expenses.
She explained that the policy would provide funds to help her children pay expenses following her death.
The husband argued that premiums benefiting the children should not be included in the calculation of spousal maintenance.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals agreed with the husband.
The court explained that spousal maintenance and child support serve distinct purposes.
Maintenance addresses the reasonable needs of the recipient spouse, while life insurance premiums generally benefit the designated beneficiaries.
Although the wife expected the policy proceeds to help pay funeral and estate expenses, the record did not establish restrictions requiring the children to use the proceeds for those purposes.
Because the benefits would belong to the children, the premiums could not properly be treated as the wife’s maintenance needs under the circumstances presented.
The appellate court remanded the maintenance determination to address the improper inclusion of those expenses.
Key Takeaway: Maintenance and child support are separate legal obligations. Expenses primarily benefiting children or other third parties may not qualify as reasonable maintenance needs of the recipient spouse.
Parentage
Bowers v. Bowers, No. ED103176, 2017 WL 2822506 (Mo. Ct. App. June 30, 2017)
Issue: Whether a nonbiological parent may receive third-party custody when the biological parents are found unsuitable or unable to provide appropriate care.
Background: Jason and Jessica began a romantic relationship in October 2007 while Jessica was pregnant with a child conceived with another man.
Jason and Jessica agreed that Jason would assume the role of the child’s father.
The biological father initially remained uninvolved.
After the child’s birth, Jason and Jessica executed a Missouri Affidavit Acknowledging Paternity, and the child’s birth certificate identified Jason as the father.
In May 2013, Jason filed a petition for dissolution of marriage and requested joint legal and physical custody.
Jessica acknowledged Jason’s legal father status but sought sole custody.
In January 2014, the biological father intervened and sought a determination of paternity and joint custody.
Following trial, the circuit court found that the biological father was unfit, unsuitable, and unable to serve as the child’s custodian.
The court also expressed serious concerns about Jessica’s parenting, particularly her willingness to support the child’s continued relationship with Jason.
The court determined that Jessica and Jason could not effectively co-parent.
It awarded Jason sole legal and physical custody as a third-party custodian.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings concerning Jessica’s suitability and rejected her procedural challenge to Jason’s ability to receive third-party custody.
The court concluded that the custody determination was consistent with the child’s best interests and the applicable legal framework.
Key Takeaway: Biological parentage is an important consideration in custody proceedings, but Missouri law recognizes circumstances in which a third party may receive custody when the statutory requirements are established.
M.W. v. S.W., No. ED105546, 2017 WL 6028666 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2017), rehearing and/or transfer denied Jan. 30, 2018
Issue: Whether allegations involving concealed biological parentage support civil claims for fraud, conspiracy, and related causes of action.
Background: The parties married in 1991.
The wife gave birth to twins in 2000, and the husband was their biological father.
In 2001, she gave birth to a second set of twins.
Approximately ten years later, the husband learned of an affair and received information suggesting that another man might be the biological father of the younger twins.
A 2011 paternity test established that the husband was not their biological father.
The husband subsequently adopted the twins with the biological father’s consent. The adoption judgment was entered July 12, 2011.
The wife filed for dissolution in 2012.
The husband filed a separate six-count civil petition asserting claims involving fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, negligence, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, alleged deceptive practices under the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, and alienation of affections.
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the biological father and the wife.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of the biological father.
The husband’s conspiracy claim depended on establishing an underlying actionable fraud.
The evidence did not show that the biological father made a false representation to the husband concerning the twins’ parentage. It also did not establish that the biological father knew their parentage with certainty before testing.
Consequently, the necessary elements of fraud were not established against him.
However, the appellate court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of the wife because the procedural grounds supporting that ruling were insufficient.
Key Takeaway: Claims arising from concealed parentage must satisfy the elements of the particular civil causes of action asserted. Emotional and financial consequences alone do not establish fraud or civil conspiracy without the required proof.
K.M.M. v. K.E.W., No. ED105087, 2017 WL 4365570 (Mo. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2017), rehearing and/or transfer denied Nov. 13, 2017
Issue: Whether a former same-sex partner who helped plan and raise a child may seek third-party custody or visitation based on a bonded familial relationship.
Background: Kathleen and Kate began a committed romantic relationship in October 2007.
Kathleen and her two children moved into Kate’s home in 2008.
The parties opened a joint bank account in 2009 and purchased a residence together.
In March 2011, they decided to have a child through assisted reproduction.
Both signed documents at a fertility clinic addressing the procedure and their anticipated parental responsibilities.
The trial court found that both participated in decisions throughout the pregnancy and that Kathleen played a significant role in nurturing and caring for the child.
The parties separated in 2015.
Kathleen sought legal parentage, joint legal custody, visitation, and alternative relief based on a voluntary custody agreement, equitable parentage, and third-party custody principles.
The trial court dismissed or denied her claims.
Although the court recognized a familial relationship, it concluded that Kathleen had not overcome Kate’s presumptive parental authority.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals rejected Kathleen’s constitutional arguments because they had not been properly preserved.
It also concluded that her contract claim did not adequately allege the elements necessary to establish an enforceable agreement.
However, the appellate court found error in the trial court’s analysis of third-party custody under Section 452.375.5(5)(a).
The court explained that a parent’s constitutional interest in the care, custody, and control of a child receives significant protection.
A third party seeking custody must establish either parental unfitness or circumstances demonstrating that the child’s welfare requires third-party custody.
Under the welfare analysis, the court must first determine whether special or extraordinary circumstances exist.
Only after that determination may the court separately evaluate the child’s best interests.
The trial court had improperly combined those inquiries.
The appellate court emphasized the substantial evidence of a bonded familial relationship between Kathleen and the child.
It reversed and remanded for further proceedings concerning the appropriate statutory analysis, Kathleen’s suitability, and the child’s best interests.
Key Takeaway: Third-party custody requires a structured legal analysis. A significant bonded parent-child relationship may be relevant to the welfare inquiry, but courts must separately address the statutory requirements and the child’s best interests.
Child Custody
J.F.H. v. S.L.S., No. ED105044, 2017 WL 6816712 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2017)
Issue: Whether transportation difficulties, communication problems, and isolated parenting disputes justify substantially reducing a parent’s physical custody.
Background: A 2009 paternity judgment awarded the parents joint legal and physical custody.
The mother’s residence was designated for mailing and educational purposes.
As the child reached school age, the existing arrangement required the father to make lengthy trips between the child’s school and his workplace.
The father alleged that the transportation requirements interfered with employment and resulted in excessive travel for the child.
Both parents sought to have their respective residences designated for educational purposes.
The mother also sought sole legal and physical custody.
The trial court awarded the mother sole legal and physical custody and reduced the father’s school-year parenting time to alternating weekends.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals distinguished the evidence supporting modification of legal custody from the evidence necessary to modify physical custody.
The transportation distance was inherent in the original parenting arrangement and therefore did not independently establish a substantial change in circumstances.
The parties’ inability to communicate was relevant to joint legal custody, but it did not necessarily justify substantially reducing physical custody.
The mother also relied on two incidents in which the father enrolled the child in school contrary to the existing judgment and alleged that the father attempted to alienate the child from her.
The appellate court explained that isolated interference, without evidence of its effect on the child, was insufficient to support the substantial reduction in parenting time.
The court affirmed the legal custody determination but reversed and remanded the physical custody portion.
Key Takeaway: Legal custody and physical custody involve distinct considerations. Evidence supporting a change in decision-making authority does not automatically justify a substantial reduction in parenting time.
S.K.B.-G. by and Through J.P.G. v. A.M.G., 532 S.W.3d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017), rehearing and/or transfer denied Oct. 23, 2017
Issue: Whether a joint physical custody award must provide equal parenting time and whether a parenting plan may include a future school-related schedule.
Background: The parties were never married and had a child in August 2012.
In October 2015, the father filed a petition to establish paternity, custody, visitation, and support.
The mother acknowledged his paternity but sought sole legal and physical custody.
The parties had previously exercised an alternating-week custody arrangement.
In 2015, the mother ended that arrangement and informed the father that he would no longer receive custody time.
The father raised concerns about the child’s care while in the maternal grandmother’s home because of the grandmother’s history involving methamphetamine use and criminal conduct.
The trial court awarded joint legal and physical custody.
It designated the father’s residence for educational purposes when the child reached school age.
The father was ordered to pay $18 per month in child support, and the mother was ordered to contribute $4,000 toward his attorney’s fees.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals rejected the mother’s argument that joint physical custody required equal parenting time.
Joint physical custody provides each parent significant periods of residential custody, but those periods need not be equal.
The appellate court also considered a provision addressing what would happen if the mother moved into the child’s school district.
Although courts may establish parenting schedules that account for a child entering school, the appellate court struck the particular conditional provision from the judgment while leaving the remaining provisions intact.
The court also upheld the joint legal custody arrangement, including the requirement that the parents discuss important decisions and the father’s final decision-making authority.
Finally, the court affirmed the $4,000 attorney’s fee award after considering the parties’ financial circumstances and the litigation.
Key Takeaway: Joint physical custody does not require an equal division of parenting time. Parenting plans must also be carefully drafted to avoid improper conditional provisions or unauthorized automatic modifications.
Moyers v. Lindenbusch, 530 S.W.3d 646 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether a proposed interstate relocation and a parent’s interference with the other parent’s relationship justify modifying custody.
Background: The parties divorced in 2013 and had three children.
The mother subsequently relocated with the children to another state.
In April 2016, she notified the father of her intention to relocate again, to a different state.
The father moved to prohibit the relocation and requested sole legal and physical custody.
He proposed that the children return to their former community and schools.
The trial court awarded the father sole legal custody and continued joint physical custody.
The mother appealed, arguing that the court had improperly used the custody decision to punish her conduct and lifestyle.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The trial court had considered the eight best-interest factors identified in Section 452.375.2, including:
- The parents’ wishes and proposed parenting plans.
- The child’s need for frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with both parents.
- The child’s relationships with parents, siblings, and other important individuals.
- Each parent’s willingness to encourage the child’s relationship with the other parent.
- The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.
- The mental and physical health of the individuals involved, including any history of abuse.
- Either parent’s intention to relocate the child’s principal residence.
- The child’s wishes concerning custody.
The trial court found that several factors favored the father, including the children’s relationships, the mother’s interference with communication, the children’s educational stability, and the proposed relocation.
The court found that the children’s expressed preferences favored the mother, but those preferences were not controlling.
The appellate court rejected the claim that the judgment was intended to punish the mother.
Instead, the record showed that the court evaluated the children’s best interests under the statutory factors.
Key Takeaway: Relocation disputes require careful consideration of the child’s best interests. A child’s preference is relevant but does not control the outcome, and interference with the other parent’s relationship may influence custody.
Fessler v. McGovern, 524 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether evidence of alcohol misuse supports restrictions on parenting time and whether a court must address holidays and special occasions in its parenting plan.
Background: The unmarried parents had one child.
In 2015, the father sought joint legal and physical custody.
His proposed parenting plan provided parenting time on the first, third, and applicable fifth weekends of each month, four weeks during the summer, and specified holidays.
The mother sought sole legal and physical custody.
She proposed a graduated parenting schedule beginning with supervised visits every other Saturday for three hours during the first six months, eventually increasing to alternating weekends.
She also requested a condition that the father be sober when picking up the child.
The trial court adopted the mother’s proposed arrangement.
It relied on evidence concerning the father’s alcohol consumption, driving while intoxicated, the child’s sleeping difficulties, and the father’s limited history of overnight parenting time.
However, the judgment did not adequately address holidays and special occasions.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s consideration of the father’s alcohol use.
The mother had testified about repeated incidents of intoxication, impaired driving, and the father passing out in the home.
That evidence supported the trial court’s concerns about the effect of his conduct on the child.
However, the appellate court found reversible error in the parenting plan’s failure to address the events required by Sections 452.310.8 and 452.375.9.
The statutory parenting plan requirements included provisions for:
- Major holidays and school holidays.
- The child’s birthday, Mother’s Day, and Father’s Day.
- Weekday, weekend, and school vacation schedules.
- Transfer times and locations.
- Transportation responsibilities.
- Telephone access.
- Procedures for temporary schedule changes.
- Requested restrictions and the reasons supporting them.
The court explained that a trial court could not simply omit required subjects, even if a parent’s proposed parenting plan did not adequately address them.
Key Takeaway: Courts may restrict parenting time when credible evidence establishes safety concerns. However, the resulting parenting plan must still comply with statutory requirements concerning holidays, transportation, communication, and other scheduling matters.
Ashton v. Ashton, 511 S.W.3d 473 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether an informal relocation notice triggers the statutory deadline for the other parent to object.
Background: Following dissolution in 2011, the parties shared joint legal and physical custody.
Their parenting arrangement provided each parent two weekday overnights and alternating weekends.
On March 12, 2016, the mother emailed the father stating that she intended to relocate the children on April 1, 2016.
She acknowledged that she had not provided the required 60 days’ advance notice because the sale of her residence occurred quickly.
The father objected, noting that he had not received notice by certified mail and that the proposed move was scheduled less than 30 days after the email.
He filed a motion to prohibit the relocation.
The mother sought dismissal, arguing that the father had failed to object within the statutory period.
The trial court dismissed the father’s motion.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal.
Section 452.377.2 required written notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, at least 60 days before the proposed relocation absent court-determined exigent circumstances.
The statute also required information concerning the proposed residence, telephone number if known, intended moving date, reasons for relocation, and proposed revised custody schedule.
The appellate court discussed earlier authority, including Baxley v. Jarred, 91 S.W.3d 192 (Mo. App. 2002), addressing whether actual notice could satisfy the statute despite a defect in the method of delivery.
However, even assuming the email constituted actual notice, the mother had not provided the required advance notice.
No court had determined that exigent circumstances justified the shortened period.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by dismissing the father’s objection.
Key Takeaway: Relocation notice requirements protect the other parent’s opportunity to object. An informal communication may not satisfy the statutory requirements, particularly when the required notice period has not been observed.
S.S.S. v. C.V.S., No. SC96307 (Mo. banc 2017)
Issue: Whether a biological parent’s limited emotional relationship and failure to provide financial support establish abandonment or neglect sufficient to permit adoption without consent.
Background: The mother and stepfather petitioned to adopt the child and terminate the biological father’s parental rights.
The circuit court determined that the father’s consent was unnecessary under Section 453.040(7), finding willful abandonment and willful, substantial, and continuous neglect.
The mother testified that the father did not have a close relationship with the child.
She described missed or late visits, limited engagement, inappropriate behavior during contact, and concerns about the father’s attention to the child’s safety.
The guardian ad litem similarly reported that the child did not consider herself close to the father and that their interactions were limited.
During an observed one-hour visit, the father arrived approximately 20 minutes late and demonstrated little meaningful interaction.
Evidence also showed that the father had not personally provided financial support during the six months preceding the adoption petition, despite having the ability and resources to do so.
The circuit court determined that the paternal grandmother, rather than the father, had provided the $400 monthly payments.
Court’s Decision: The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
The court explained that the circuit court could reasonably conclude that the father’s relationship with the child was superficial or tenuous despite some contact and visitation.
Although the evidence might also support a different inference, appellate courts defer to the trial court’s assessment when competing reasonable conclusions are possible.
The absence of financial support during the relevant period further supported the trial court’s determination.
Key Takeaway: Adoption without a biological parent’s consent requires satisfaction of the applicable statutory requirements. Courts may consider the quality of parental contact, financial support, and the parent’s actual involvement in the child’s life.
Property Division
Landewee v. Landewee, 515 S.W.3d 691 (Mo. banc 2017)
Issue: How a court should divide a contingent pension benefit and whether an unequal property division is equitable.
Background: The parties married in 1991.
During the marriage, they acquired interests in a family floral business, related real estate, the marital residence, retirement benefits, vehicles, insurance policies, bank accounts, and debt.
The trial court awarded the wife the floral business, associated assets, the marital residence, her retirement account, insurance policies, and certain debts.
The husband received his pension, retirement account, vehicle, insurance policies, and bank account.
To equalize the distribution, the court ordered the wife to pay the husband $196,496.50.
The court classified the husband’s pension as marital property but assigned it a current value of zero because the benefit was contingent and not yet payable.
The judgment provided that if the pension matured, the husband would pay the wife half of the accrued marital benefit.
The wife challenged the pension treatment and overall property division.
Court’s Decision: The appellate court upheld the judgment.
The pension benefit was not presently available, and the husband might never receive it if he died before the benefit matured.
The trial court’s deferred distribution accounted for the contingent nature of the benefit.
The court also considered the statutory property division factors under Section 452.330, including the parties’ economic circumstances, contributions to marital property, nonmarital property, marital conduct, and custodial arrangements.
The wife argued that her business was struggling, that she had fewer retirement resources, and that the husband’s misconduct warranted a larger share of the estate.
However, the evidence showed that she received approximately $70,000 annually from the business and was awarded real estate worth approximately $500,000.
The appellate court found no reversible error in the overall distribution.
Key Takeaway: Courts may use deferred distribution methods for retirement benefits that are not yet payable. Equitable property division also requires consideration of the entire marital estate rather than isolated assets or allegations.
L.R.S. v. C.A.S., 525 S.W.3d 172 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether marital misconduct and the use of marital funds for an extramarital relationship justify an unequal property division.
Background: The parties married in 1992 and enjoyed substantial financial resources and a high standard of living.
The wife stopped working outside the home in 1998 and devoted her time to the household and children, with assistance from others.
The husband had a history of alcohol and cocaine addiction and sexual relationships outside the marriage.
The trial court divided the marital estate 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband.
The court also found that the husband had used marital assets to benefit a girlfriend, including expenditures for furniture, clothing, personal care, gasoline, and jewelry.
The husband challenged the unequal division and the trial court’s treatment of his conduct under a local rule governing the preservation of marital assets.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed the property division.
The appellate court explained that the trial court’s findings concerning improper expenditures could be considered as part of its broader evaluation of the parties’ conduct during the marriage.
Although the trial court found conduct violating the local rule, it did not have to impose a separate contempt sanction for that conduct to be relevant to property division.
The 60/40 distribution was equitable in light of the circumstances presented.
Key Takeaway: Marital misconduct and the improper expenditure of marital assets may influence property division. Courts have discretion to consider conduct affecting the marital estate when determining an equitable distribution.
Hagan v. Hagan, 530 S.W.3d 608 (Mo. App. S.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether concealment, dissipation, and unauthorized transfers of marital assets support an unequal property division.
Background: The parties had been married for more than 30 years.
Following the discovery of the husband’s extramarital relationship, the wife filed for dissolution.
The court entered an order requiring preservation of marital assets.
Despite that order, the husband transferred his bowling alley business to a trust associated with his father without the wife’s consent.
The trial court also found evidence that the husband had concealed, dissipated, or transferred other assets, including:
- Firearms that he claimed to have disposed of without supporting documentation.
- A $16,500 debt owed to an entity controlled by his father, for which he received payment without accounting to the wife.
- Proceeds from the sale of a vehicle that he retained.
- Substantial business assets transferred to his parents without adequate valuation or disclosure.
The trial court established a division favoring the wife, described as 65/35 and resulting in her receiving approximately 59.4% of the net marital estate.
The husband challenged multiple aspects of the classification, valuation, and division.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The appellate court emphasized the trial court’s broad discretion in evaluating evidence and dividing marital property.
Many of the husband’s arguments were inadequately presented or unsupported by the record.
The court also rejected his challenge to the valuation of a dog-breeding website.
Five days before trial, the husband had sworn that the website was worth $10,000 and requested that it be awarded to the wife.
After the court awarded the website to him, he argued that it had no value.
The appellate court concluded that he could not complain about a valuation he had previously invited.
The court also deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations concerning disputed ownership and asset values.
Key Takeaway: Concealing, dissipating, or transferring marital assets can substantially affect property division. Parties must also present consistent valuations and properly supported appellate arguments.
In re Marriage of Hanson, No. SD34963, 2018 WL 1193444 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2018)
Issue: Whether real estate acquired during marriage was a gift and whether a trial court must accept an expert’s valuation of the marital residence.
Background: The parties married in 1990, and their dissolution judgment was entered April 4, 2017.
The husband challenged several aspects of the property division.
Two principal disputes concerned his interest in funeral home real estate and the valuation of the marital residence.
Funeral Home Property: The husband held an interest in funeral home real estate jointly titled with another individual.
He argued that his interest was a gift and should therefore be classified as nonmarital property.
He relied on testimony from the other owner that the husband’s interest was intended to be contingent.
However, the real estate had been acquired during the marriage, and no documentation established a conveyance or other transaction converting the interest into a gift.
Marital Residence: The trial court valued the marital residence at $108,000.
The property had been purchased for that amount in 2005.
The husband had listed its value as $115,000, while the wife valued it at $150,000.
The husband later presented testimony from an individual who estimated that the property would bring only $35,000 at auction.
That witness was a licensed auctioneer rather than a licensed real estate appraiser and had not relied on comparable sales.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The trial court was entitled to disbelieve testimony that the funeral home interest had been received as a gift.
The evidence supported the conclusion that the interest was acquired during the marriage through the husband’s employment relationship.
Regarding the residence, the trial court was not required to accept the auctioneer’s valuation.
A court may resolve conflicting valuation evidence and select a figure within the supported range.
The appellate court upheld the $108,000 valuation and rejected the husband’s remaining property division challenges.
Key Takeaway: Property classification depends on evidence concerning acquisition and ownership. Courts also have discretion to evaluate competing valuations and are not automatically bound by a witness presented as an expert.
Maintenance
L.R.S. v. C.A.S., 525 S.W.3d 172 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether a spouse’s marital standard of living and property award were properly considered when determining maintenance.
Background: The parties had a lengthy marriage and substantial financial resources.
The wife had not worked outside the home since 1998.
The trial court determined that her reasonable monthly expenses were $16,784.
It imputed $2,167 per month in employment income and ordered the husband to pay $14,617 per month in maintenance.
The wife received 60% of the marital estate.
The husband challenged the maintenance calculation.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals addressed two distinct issues.
First, it upheld the trial court’s use of the parties’ marital standard of living as a guide for determining the wife’s reasonable needs.
The court recognized that, particularly after a lengthy marriage in which one spouse did not pursue employment, the marital standard of living may provide important evidence of the parties’ established reasonable needs.
The trial court had also reduced certain claimed expenses to amounts it considered reasonable.
However, the appellate court found that the record did not adequately establish whether the trial court had considered the property awarded to the wife.
Section 452.335 requires consideration of the property available to a spouse requesting maintenance, including income that may be generated from that property.
Because the wife received 60% of the marital estate, the court needed to evaluate whether those assets affected her ability to meet her needs.
The maintenance determination was reversed and remanded for further consideration.
Key Takeaway: A spouse’s marital standard of living may inform reasonable maintenance needs, but courts must also evaluate the property and income-producing resources available to that spouse.
Barden v. Barden, No. ED105496, 2018 WL 326416 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2018)
Issue: Whether a substantial change in the paying spouse’s financial circumstances supports reducing maintenance.
Background: The former husband sought modification of maintenance, child support, college expenses, and other provisions of the dissolution judgment.
Following an earlier appeal and remand, the trial court reduced his maintenance obligation and modified several child support provisions.
The former wife appealed again, arguing that the husband’s income did not justify reducing maintenance.
At dissolution, the husband earned approximately $263,947 annually.
After losing his employment in 2012, his annual salary fell to approximately $50,000 by 2013.
His monthly income at that time was approximately $3,878, while his reasonable monthly expenses were approximately $5,279.
By 2016, his gross monthly income had increased to $14,433, but his reasonable monthly expenses had also risen to approximately $14,055.
The trial court also considered his debts and expenditures for the parties’ children, including vehicles, transportation expenses, and approximately $1,317 per month toward one child’s college education.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed the maintenance modification.
The court explained that a substantial and continuing change in circumstances may justify modifying maintenance when the paying spouse cannot meet reasonable needs while continuing to pay the original obligation.
Although the husband’s income had recovered significantly, the trial court could consider his financial obligations, debts, and other resources under Section 452.370.1.
The record supported the finding that his financial circumstances justified the reduced maintenance obligation.
Key Takeaway: Maintenance modification involves more than comparing current income with income at dissolution. Courts may consider reasonable expenses, debts, financial resources, and the ability to satisfy existing obligations.
Wagner v. Wagner, No. ED105096, 2017 WL 5707421 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2017), transfer denied Jan. 30, 2018
Issue: Whether increased income from a jointly owned business supports terminating maintenance and whether litigation conduct supports attorney’s fees.
Background: The parties dissolved their 40-year marriage in May 2004.
Their consent judgment provided that they would continue to jointly own Wagner Enterprises, LLC, as tenants in common.
Each would receive half of the business income remaining after expenses.
At dissolution, each received approximately $5,384 per month in pretax business income.
The husband was ordered to pay $791 per month in modifiable maintenance and approximately $150 per month for the wife’s supplemental health insurance.
Nearly 11 years later, the husband sought modification.
The trial court found that the wife could meet her reasonable monthly needs without maintenance and terminated the $791 obligation.
However, the court declined to terminate the supplemental health insurance obligation.
It also ordered the wife to pay $7,000 toward the husband’s attorney’s fees.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Under Section 452.370, modifiable maintenance may be changed when circumstances have become sufficiently substantial and continuing to make the existing terms unreasonable.
The wife argued that future increases in business income were foreseeable when the dissolution judgment was entered.
The appellate court rejected the argument.
Although the parties knew the business could generate income, the wife could not necessarily rely on that fact to prevent consideration of her present ability to meet reasonable needs.
The trial court properly considered the financial circumstances and determined that continued maintenance was no longer justified.
The appellate court also upheld the $7,000 attorney’s fee award.
The trial court had considered the resources consumed by the prolonged litigation and the circumstances surrounding the proceedings.
Key Takeaway: Modifiable maintenance may be terminated when the recipient spouse can meet reasonable needs without continued assistance. Litigation conduct and unnecessary expense may also influence attorney’s fee awards.
McHugh v. Slomka, 531 S.W.3d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017)
Issue: Whether the terms of a marital settlement agreement control maintenance modification following the paying spouse’s reemployment.
Background: The parties married in 1989 and had three children.
The wife was primarily responsible for raising the children and did not work outside the home during much of the marriage.
The husband previously earned approximately $250,000 annually, plus bonuses ranging from $37,500 to $62,500.
He lost his employment in 2009.
The parties dissolved their marriage in February 2011.
Their marital separation agreement required the husband to pay $2,000 per month in modifiable maintenance.
The agreement expressly recognized that the parties could not maintain their previous marital standard of living while the husband was unemployed and that maintenance could be modified when he became employed.
By June 2011, the husband reported household income of approximately $550,000 annually.
The wife moved with the children to live with her parents because of financial necessity.
She obtained limited part-time employment paying $13 per hour for approximately eight months.
In October 2012, she sought increased maintenance and child support, reimbursement of various expenses, and attorney’s fees.
The husband sought reduced maintenance and changes to legal custody.
Following trial, the circuit court reduced maintenance to $1,000 per month and increased child support to $3,169 per month for three children.
The wife appealed.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court had improperly disregarded the parties’ contractual maintenance provisions.
The marital separation agreement expressly contemplated modification upon the husband’s reemployment.
The appellate court explained that marital settlement agreements are interpreted using ordinary principles of contract construction.
The trial court had focused on the wife’s reduced expenses without adequately applying the agreement’s provisions concerning the husband’s return to employment and the parties’ marital standard of living.
The appellate court directed reconsideration of maintenance consistent with the agreement.
The court also addressed child support.
When maintenance and child support are both being determined, maintenance must be calculated first because the maintenance amount can affect the Form 14 child support calculation.
Accordingly, the case was remanded for recalculation of maintenance followed by an amended child support determination.
Key Takeaway: The language of a marital settlement agreement can significantly affect future maintenance modification. When maintenance and child support are both at issue, the order of calculation matters.
Layden v. Layden, 514 S.W.3d 667 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017)
Issue: Whether a reduction in income resulting from workplace misconduct justifies modifying maintenance and whether a new spouse’s financial contributions may be considered.
Background: The husband sought to reduce or terminate his maintenance obligation after a workplace demotion reduced his income by approximately $600 per month.
The trial court found that the demotion resulted from inappropriate conduct and discriminatory statements made in the presence of female coworkers.
The husband testified that he had applied for another position and obtained part-time employment to supplement his reduced income.
He stopped paying maintenance, asserting that he could no longer afford it.
The wife obtained a wage garnishment order.
The trial court denied his modification request, finding that the demotion did not constitute a substantial and continuing change in circumstances justifying relief.
The court also considered the financial resources available through the husband’s new marriage.
Court’s Decision: The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The appellate court concluded that the husband’s intentional workplace misconduct supported the trial court’s determination that the income reduction was voluntary for purposes of the maintenance modification analysis.
The husband relied on Willis v. Willis, 50 S.W.3d 378 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001), which distinguished reckless or irresponsible conduct from a voluntary and deliberate reduction in income.
However, the court found the circumstances distinguishable because the husband’s demotion resulted from intentional, unprofessional conduct.
The court also rejected the argument that it was improper to consider financial contributions from the husband’s new wife.
Section 452.370 expressly permits courts to consider the extent to which a party’s reasonable expenses are or should be shared by a spouse or another person with whom the party resides.
The husband testified that he and his new wife shared a bank account and used their combined funds to pay household expenses.
Key Takeaway: A paying spouse may not obtain a maintenance reduction merely because intentional misconduct results in reduced earnings. Courts may also consider household expense sharing when evaluating the spouse’s financial circumstances.
Legislative Developments
Missouri Adoptee Rights Act — House Bill 1599
Issue: Access to original birth certificates for adult adoptees.
On July 1, 2016, Governor Jay Nixon signed House Bill 1599, commonly known as the Missouri Adoptee Rights Act.
The legislation expanded the ability of adult adoptees to request uncertified copies of their original birth certificates created before adoption.
The law established different eligibility dates depending on the adoptee’s year of birth.
For adoptees born before 1941: Requests for an uncertified copy of the original birth certificate could begin August 28, 2016.
For adoptees born in or after 1941: Requests could begin January 1, 2018.
The legislation represented an important development concerning access to adoption-related vital records.
Individuals seeking records should consult the current requirements of the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services.
Additional information is available through the Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services.
Key Takeaway: Missouri expanded access to original birth certificates for adult adoptees. The applicable procedures and eligibility requirements should be reviewed before submitting a records request.
Understanding These Missouri Family Law Decisions
These appellate decisions illustrate several recurring principles in Missouri domestic relations litigation.
Child support: Courts must carefully evaluate income, gifts, earning capacity, disability, and the Form 14 calculation. The timing of modification motions can also affect retroactive support.
Parentage and third-party custody: Biological relationships, legal parentage, adoption, and significant emotional bonds may raise different legal questions. Courts must apply the appropriate statutory and constitutional standards.
Child custody and parenting time: The child’s best interests remain central. Courts consider parental cooperation, safety, relocation, the child’s relationships, and the need for frequent, continuing, and meaningful contact with both parents.
Property division: Missouri law requires an equitable, rather than necessarily equal, distribution of marital property. Asset valuations, retirement benefits, marital misconduct, and dissipation of assets may affect the result.
Maintenance: Courts evaluate reasonable needs, financial resources, earning capacity, marital standard of living, and the ability to pay. Settlement agreement provisions and changes in financial circumstances can affect modification proceedings.
Procedural requirements: Preserving objections, complying with statutory notice requirements, presenting adequate valuation evidence, and properly drafting judgments are essential to protecting a party’s legal position.
Speak With a Missouri Family Law Attorney
Family law matters frequently involve difficult questions concerning children, finances, property, and the future of a family.
Understanding Missouri appellate decisions and statutory requirements can help individuals make informed decisions when considering dissolution of marriage, child custody, parenting time, paternity, child support, spousal maintenance, or property division.
Stange Law Firm, PC represents individuals in domestic relations matters throughout Missouri and other jurisdictions in which the firm practices.
Our attorneys work with clients to evaluate their circumstances, understand the applicable law, and prepare for negotiations and court proceedings.
To learn more about your legal options, contact Stange Law Firm, PC to schedule a confidential consultation.
Disclaimer: This article provides general legal information and is not legal advice. The appellate decisions discussed are from 2017 and early 2018, and the adoption legislation discussed was enacted in 2016. This is a historical case-law update. Statutes, court rules, and judicial interpretations may have changed since these decisions were issued. Individuals should consult current Missouri law and a qualified attorney regarding their particular circumstances.
